The Janus Face of the Demographic Transition in the Arab World The Decisive Role of Nuptiality
7. Accelerated Ageing
Although most reports on the Middle East and North Africa today are concerned with
the fact that the Arab World has one of the youngest populations in the world, ageing
has already started and will accelerate during the next decades. It is mainly because of
drops in fertility and increasing life-expectancy, that ageing will soon become a major
challenge for the Arab world. Median ages are on the rise as the proportions of youth
are dropping, while the percentage of (in-active) elderly people is increasing. As oldage
dependency rates are increasing and child dependency rates are decreasing, a
quickly larger growing group of elderly people will have to rely on care from shrinking
proportions of young people. As a consequence, burdens for the next generation and
insecurity among the older generation is likely to augment. Policy makers in the region
should quickly shift their focus from challenges related to the care for an ‘excessive’
proportion of youngsters, to a rising needy proportion of elderly people.
Like in Europe today, ageing will become a challenge for Arab societies in the future,
but in a somewhat different way. First of all, the pace of the ageing process will evolve
faster than was the case in Europe, as mortality and fertility decrease faster in most
Arab countries than in historical Europe. This makes it necessary to develop a
sophisticated ageing policy early on, to avoid far-reaching negative consequences
related to amongst other things, health-care, old-age pensions, and labor market
performance. As ageing will proceed on accelerated speed, pressure will arise on the
Pay as You go pension systems. These systems are likely to fail and even collapse if the
current low retirement ages will not be raised (Kárpáti 2011) Second, in the Arab World
ageing will cause other challenges than in the West, as in most countries in the region,
the primary safety-net is not a social security system provided by the state (mostly
non-existent), but family assistance (Olmsted 2005; Rashad, Osman & Roudi-Fahimi
2005). This means that the costs ageing generates will largely be carried by families and
individuals. After all the coverage of the pension systems in the region is very low,
which means that very few people in the region will be able to rely on retirement
payment (Kárpáti 2011). This could create new poverty, especially in countries where
public health care is not free (all countries apart from the Gulf states). Poverty is also
more likely to increase where the transition from extended to nuclear families is most
advanced, because in nuclear families there are less people and less resources, that can
be used to assist elderly people. At the same time, this change in family system went
hand in hand with a decline in mutual respect and support between the generations, as
the geographic and emotional distance between older and younger people has grown
larger and a revival of extended families is less likely to occur (Economic and Social
Comission for Western Asia 2002: 3).
Mainly due to differences in the timing and pace of the fertility transition there are
major regional differences in the ageing process (graph 12). The good news is that
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during the next decades the richest Arab countries will be most affected by ageing,
while the poorest Arab countries will be least affected. The Gulf States will be most
affected, as fertility has declined profoundly, and life-expectancy has risen most
spectacularly. Since most of these states provide health-care for free, public
expenditure related to medical care will rise massively. One of the problem areas in
this region is migration. The oil-rich countries of the Gulf have attracted huge numbers
of migrants, which are often unaccompanied by partners and which are badly
integrated. These people as they grow older will most likely get into the deepest
trouble as they are unable to rely on family assistance. The Maghreb is the second
region which will be most affected by ageing. The high pace of the demographic
change in combination with the poor social security provided by the states, makes this
region most vulnerable to the ageing process. Social inequality is likely to augment. A
rift may arise between those families which can rely on remittances from abroad and
those families which do not have such additional financial resources. In the Mashreq,
and especially in the peripheral Southern Arab countries, the (negative consequences
of the) ageing process will start later, as fertility has only recently declined. This gives
these countries somewhat extra time to implement adequate ageing policies.
Finally, some people will be more affected by the negative consequences of ageing than
others. Childless couples and individuals, for example, will face more difficulties to
count on care as they have no offspring available who can take care of them. Women
are more vulnerable to the negative effects of ageing than men, because females tend to
live longer, and second because they face a larger risk that they will not be able to
count on any kind of help from family members. Moreover, the extra care needed for
the elderly will largely be provided by younger females, which will decrease their
chances to work outside of the household and consequently will decrease their
potential to raise extra income for themselves and their families. While young females
will have to spend less time and energy on child-rearing, they will increasingly have to
look after elderly family members, who are no longer able to take care of themselves,
physically, mentally and financially. Problems can partially be solved if the number of
homes for elderly will be massively extended and if the cost of care in such homes will
be provided by the state. However, such a policy will only be effective if the
willingness of elderly people to move to old people’s home will increase. Currently, a
very negative attitude towards such institutions exists as elderly people feel disowned
by their children, if they are sent to such an institution.
60[عدل]
The 52 participating older adults (between the ages of 50 and 83)
رابط[عدل]
https://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/historischedemografie/resources/pdf/WOG%20working%20paper19.pdf
